that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exit. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.
What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.
I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, eithr to produce a change in anything of any nature
[247δ] σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ᾽ οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν: εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἆρ᾽ ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ὄν.
τὸ ποῖον δή; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.
λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν
or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.
Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.
Good; for perhaps later something else may occur to them and to us. As between them
[247ε] εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι: τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.
καλῶς: ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις
that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.
But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks,
[248ε] ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ᾽ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς
[249a] but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?
That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.
[249α] ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;
δεινὸν μεντἄν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.
* 참고로 화이트헤드가 AI에서 참조한 Jowett의 영역본은 다음과 같이 번역되어 있다.
Str. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of
power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for
a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the
effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being
is simply power of
Theaet. They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their
own to offer.
다시 몇 줄 아래
Str. I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active,
then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in
so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore
in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon,
as we affirm.
Str. And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and
life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we
imagine that, being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful
unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?
Theaet. That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger.